Afghanistan-A-Go-Go

A Reservist's Tale Of A Tour

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A Little Like Christmas

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As you may well recall, back in December I packed two MOB boxes full of all sorts of goodies and sent them off to come here. Last night, they arrived, delivered by a logistics convoy. It was late at night so some of our colleagues weren’t too amused in the shacks by people opening them up and rooting around. I didn’t really bother much except to find my Keurig machine and coffee, gleefully ready to bring it in to the office today and savour some really good coffee.

Alas, it was not to be.

I unpacked the machine and plugged it in and… nothing. I’m not an expert on electronics but learning fast. Part of the challenge we have here is an assortment of plugs, voltages, and amperage. I think despite my belief that I was using the right combination that something went wrong.

So we brought over another Keurig machine that was left behind and grabbed by my roommate, but it blew the fuse in the stepdown transformer at my desk, because it’s only rated for 500 amps, and the Keurig needs 1500. The shops here have a perfect transformer. For $100. We’re trying to find a solution. And hoping the good people at Keurig will replace my machine, because, well, supporting the troops is the right thing to do or something like that.

The other thing I’m incredibly excited about is the massive memory foam mattress topper I bought on whim at Costco during our Epic Shopping Trip. It was a fight to get it on a top bunk, but it’s all done now. I have a nice civilized set of sheets and all, but I seem to find sleeping in my ranger blanket more comfortable, so I’ll probably just keep doing that, but hopefully this will make it all a little more comfortable. The rest of the box contents were what we call “consumables” – soap, razor blades, shaving soap, and so on. I had a nice big score of a 50% off anything up to $250 at The Body Shop just before I sent the boxes off, so I got my favourite shaving soap there, and I think I’ll actually have some to take home when I’m done.

So other than the Keurig letdown, life’s brightening up a little, at least in terms of my little piece of the world. There’s lots going on beyond, though – more green-on-blue incidents, two yesterday. It’s a harsh reminder of having to retain vigilance. The nature of our work environment makes it a minor threat, but nevertheless, it’s probably the main thing to worry about. There was also a large bombing plot foiled at the Ministry of Defence downtown, which caught a lot of attention. It’s probably a good thing to remember that we’re not “in Kansas”, but it’s quite honestly easy to forget that from time to time.

I’ve been watching, with interest, a number of discussions in various forums about the future of Afghanistan, and the effectiveness of efforts here. Though I tend to stay fairly positive about how things are working here, optimistic that things here have improved and will continue to improve. However, there’s been several discussions about how to “do” counterinsurgency here, how good the doctrine is and how well it’s been implemented. The reality is that it seems like that all important principle of “unity of effort” isn’t perfect, and I saw that seeing the disconnect between various civilian agencies and NGOs and the military. It’s not accurate to say it’s totally dysfunctional, but one has to wonder if we’ve managed to really achieve that unity of effort, and to really understand the environment, particularly harnessing the tribal structures and mechanisms of governance. That said, the fact that people can recognize that there’s challenges there is at least an indication that there’s an understanding of the issue. Suffice it to say, the discussions have added a lot to my reading list in terms of studying COIN and development and so on. It’s not easy to see the situation through the eyes of those living here, and the impression I’ve gotten is that there’s no single POV amongst Afghans – people from down south see things remarkably differently from people in Kabul. Hardly surprising, though.

It boils down to a fairly simple conclusion, though. We can give people tools and ideas and support, but it’s up to them to decide how to use them, and what the future here will look like. I’ve always said I’d love to come here as a tourist some day, so I hope it works out.

Written by Nick

March 27, 2012 at 6:19 am

My Amusing (Maybe) Attempt At Recontextualizing Counterinsurgency

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A brief conversation about counterinsurgency in the context of parenting made me laugh the other day, and kind of inspired me to turn the doctrine in which I’ve been immersed into something that might amuse some people. What I’m going to do is rework the “counterinsurgency framework” we use into a parenting scenario, and hope that a) hilarity ensues and b) those who are interested in how this all works will find it interesting.

My disclaimer is that I’m not a parent. I don’t even have the slightest interest in ever becoming one either, but this seems superficially so simple that it really shouldn’t matter.

So, here we go. In simple terms, an insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Actually, that’s not simple terms, it’s doctrinal, but it’s also fairly simple. The creation of an insurgency generally requires three prerequisites. First, a vulnerable population, meaning a population with real or perceived grievances about their government. Second, leadership available for direction, meaning a leader who can be coerced, co-opted, or who naturally emerges to channel those grievances and allow an insurgency to take hold. Finally, there must be a lack of government control – a government unable to assert itself effectively over the population. This can be either from being too heavy-handed and thus resented or ignored (think Libya?), or being non-existent in the eyes of the population (kind of like over here, in a lot of ways).

Part of why I found this brief discussion so funny is that I perceive that something like the prerequisites exists in a lot of families, and when kids band together as they often do, I think that a situation can emerge that somewhat parallels insurgency. If you’re not picking up what I’m saying here, maybe I’ve become a curmudgeon (at 32!), but lots of people seem to have forgotten that it’s okay to discipline kids and put them in their place once in a while.

So, I can assert that a variation of the three prerequisites can occur there – kids with perceived grievances (usually perceived, anyhow!), leadership can emerge among them, and a lack of parental control. We’ll just reframe the whole armed conflict thing a bit, or we can remove it and just leave “subversion” in the definition, because that’s the stock-in-trade of kids. Smart ones, anyhow.

So, an insurgency in the real world appears when the prerequisites are met and generally then begins to try to form bonds with the population – the ultimate prize in this case. Doing so requires leadership in some form, an ideology (some ideal that binds them together) and an objective – what they want, why they want it, and how they’re going to get it. Behold the first three (of eight) Dynamics of Insurgencies! Now we just have to cover the other five. Next up is Knowledge Of The Environment. Operating close to home gives insurgents a solid understanding of how to gain and employ freedom of movement. In the case of Afghanistan, most insurgents are killed or captured within 30 miles of their home, suggesting they know the ground well and use that knowledge to good effect. In the case of kids – well, they’re also operating generally on home turf and finding ways to conspire.  They will also use their siblings to give them morale support and encouragement (Internal Support – number 5!), and develop networks which give them more to work with. This External Support (#6) can include other kids at school, the Children’s Aid Society, the Police, and anyone else they threaten to call in when they don’t get their way. In cases of divorced parents, step-parents can often be a form of external support (or a target), as can non-custodial parents. It’s very important they you study these dynamics in detail.

As for the last two, number seven is “Phases & Timing”. We derive this from Mao’s Guerilla Warfare, that insurgencies can be in any of three phases and shift between then as appropriate to circumstances. If kids appear well behaved, even if they are obviously conspiring to subvert parental authority, we could describe them as being in the Latent & Incipient Phase. Eventually they may shift to Phase 2 – Guerrilla Warfare, pushing the boundaries of the rules and rules with some transgressions, but not an obviously well-coordinated resistance. If you’ve totally failed as a parent, you’ll soon see the phase shift to War Of Movement, where their shadow government structure will be fully in place, they will gain near complete freedom of movement and action, and you as a parent will have lost all ability to control them. Based on my observation, this is not as uncommon as it should be, and so I’m hoping that if I now introduce the COIN Principles, you might be able to sort things out if this situation applies to you. The last dynamic, incidentally, is organization. Kids are adept at learning what has worked for other kids, and will choose their forms of organization and strategy based on these exchanges.

I’m guessing that if you’re still reading this, it’s because you’re realizing that you don’t have children, you have a fermenting insurgency within your own home, and you’re starting to worry about it. Don’t worry. I’ll get to the how to fix things, but this is a military philosophical experiment, and you need to understand a lot more about the nature of the threat before we can start making bold prescriptions for how to address and neutralize it.

Before I get into COIN Principles, let’s review some of the more classic organizations and forms of insurgent strategy. The first is called the “Urban Strategy”. In the COIN Model we use, we treat the Host Nation Government and Host Nation Security Forces as two separate actors bonded together, and attacking that bond can be part of an insurgent’s strategy. In the Urban Strategy, insurgents will attack the government in the hopes of provoking an overreaction by it that motivates people to join the insurgent cause. So one child defies authority in the hopes that the overreaction (ideally punishing all the kids) will inspire their siblings to side with him. In the “Foco Strategy”, which was Che Guevara’s strategy, the attacks are targeted at soft targets to show the population the weakness of the government and inspire support. I’ll liken this to the “mommy-daddy” effect where children target the parent more likely to say yes, which then demonstrates a degree of freedom of movement. This allows them to inspire followers.

If your kids are very sophisticated they may manage to put a protracted political strategy into place, which involves setting up a well indoctrinated political faction – that’s the smart kid who tries to reason with mom and dad to allow for the freedoms that the guerrilla wing wants. They’ll use the various phases and rely heavily on external and internal support to effect a long-term struggle. This would be what Mao Zedong wrote about. If they’re really, really sharp, they’ll go subversive, where the rational (political) wing disavows and even publicly condemns the more mischievous faction, all while trying to win over a political solution. They’ll deny any affiliation, of course, but it is clear they’re working together for the same end. This would be Northern Ireland – Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army.

So, what to do? What are the COIN Principles that can defeat an insurgency by rooting it out within your AO/home?

The key lies in breaking the links between the insurgents and their supporters, and the shadow government structure they’re trying to create. In the theory, you need to connect the population to the government – meaning win over the kids who are either supporting the troublemaker or are ambivalent about him. You need to isolate the belligerents from society, and you need to make the environment inhospitable to them. When that happens, parental authority becomes more secure, and harmony is restored.

There are eight principles: first is to establish legitimacy. I don’t know why, but this seems to be a sort of Rubicon that many parents can’t cross. When I was a kid, parents had legitimate authority BECAUSE THEY WERE MY PARENTS. However, I think there’s been some kind of shift in that mentality. [editor’s note: told you I was  a curmudgeon] You have to make clear that parents are the legitimate authority over kids, and that they will dominate the AO. Now, in the real COIN world, this means kinetic operations (smashing the hell out of insurgents). It’s not politically correct to beat your kids anymore, but sometimes it’s worth consideration to show people who’s boss. That’s not your only means of solving the problem though, because you cannot simply beat your kids into submission and defeat their insurgency.

Next, we need Unity Of Effort, which means both parents must be on the same page about strategy (prevent the “divide and conquer” strategy by the insurgency), and you may well need to involve other external support of your own – coaches, teachers, the police, whatever you deem necessary to deal with the insurgency. Everyone has to be on the same page. In the COIN world, the key is to make sure that political actors, the international community, the security forces, and so on have to be working toward a common end with a coordinated plan.

It’s important, as I was saying, to understand that you can’t simply kill off an insurgency. Politics Is Primary is one of the COIN Principles. You must use that to win over the hearts and minds of the population, that is, to form an emotional and logical connection with them. You must seek to understand the environment to deny the insurgents the ability to move freely within it, and use intelligence to shape the battlefield. Get to know the support networks, and figure out where support is coming from, how it travels. Figure out who the kids are that are telling them about the wonders of threatening to call the Children’s Aid Society, and keep your kids away from them. Figure whose parents spoil their kids rotten, and stop sending your kids over to their house, and so on.

Now you should be well on your way to isolating the insurgents. Remember, these days grounding kids isn’t what it used to be and probably isn’t enough, especially if you’re leaving them with their cell phone, iPad, and internet. You need to make bold and decisive action against this a priority, because without cutting off these means, they’ll have support and sanctuary. In doing so, we’re looking to establish Security Through The Rule Of Law for all kids, because that will fill the vacuum of lack of authority your unruly, undisciplined kids are seeking to exploit.

The final COIN Principle is Long Term Commitment: you need to be prepared for a long campaign to succeed. It is interesting to me that apparently, the average length of time it takes to defeat an insurgency is 16 years. You’ll need to be committed all the way until adulthood, and you may never win, but at least you’ll be prepared to handle the challenge better.

To Recap:

Three Prerequisites Of Insurgency:

1. Vulnerable Population
2. Leadership Available For Direction
3. Lack Of Government Control

Insurgent Dynamics:

1. Leadership
2. Ideology
3. Objective
4. Environment
5. External Support
6. Internal Support
7. Phases
8. Organization

Approaches To Counterinsurgency

1. Separate Insurgents From Population
2. Connect Population To Government
3. Transform Environment To Be Inhospitable To Insurgents

COIN Principles

1. Legitimacy
2. Unity Of Effort
3. Political Is Primary
4. Understand The Environment
5. Intelligence
6. Isolate Insurgents
7. Security Under Rule Of Law
8. Long Term Commitment

Things I’m Learning More About, Ways Forward, And So On…

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My visceral reaction to the terrible event in Panjwaii has been somewhat tempered, mainly because that sober thought that kicks in on learning of something so appalling has arrived, and while of course no one is excusing what happened, we are all left wondering what caused it to happen – what’s the story behind the shooter. There’s some rumblings here about him, and as is usually the case I’m sure there will be more to the story when all the facts come to light. Nevertheless, it is a tragic incident and one that every single person here I think I can fairly assume wishes hadn’t happened and is forced to redouble their efforts at relationship building with counterparts by it. I think that’s all I can say. We’re still committed to what we’re doing here, we’re still seeing that there’s progress and a point to being here, and the talk of just giving up isn’t well received by those of us in-country. That, however, is politics, and it’s not our bailiwick. And it’s certainly not something I’m going to get into. It’s not my place. We’re here until we’re not here, and it’s not us that will decide anything on that matter.

A while back I posted about counterinsurgency, the crash course I took over a weekend back in Gagetown specifically. My job has actually pushed me into much more depth on that topic, which has been very interesting. I’ve had a particular interest for quite a while in civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) for quite a while, and COIN in general as well, so it’s fitting that I’m been doing a lot more work related to it and that’s what the focus of my time here will be on. It will stand me in good stead for some of the things I’d like to do with my military career in the future, after I leave this place. The fact is that dealing with insurgencies is likely to be a major aim of western militaries in the future, and as NATO works to redefine itself (and other alliances emerge), it’ll be something that is of interest to more and more people.

An ideal quote that I’ve heard about it is “You cannot kill off an insurgency.” It’s true. Someone I was discussing the future of Afghanistan and specifically the US role in Afghanistan in light of things like the BAF Koran burning incident and the shooting in Panjwaii basically tried to say “we should just  keep killing them (i.e., the Taliban) in such numbers that they are forced to seek negotiations”. It doesn’t really work that way. At all. The analogy I like best is a weed – it’ll keep growing back if you don’t dig out the roots – if you don’t address the root problems. And no amount of kinetic actions (which is a polite, more scientific sounding term for killing people) does that. Undoubtedly, there are people in the insurgency here (which is composed of several groups) that need killing, and that’s fine. I’m not going to say otherwise. However, that alone will not fix anything, because there are legitimate, real problems and grievances in this country that have to be fixed, and doing so will make the insurgency irrelevant. It will, as the theory goes, separate the population from the insurgency, build bonds with government, and ideally make Afghanistan a functioning country.

Counterinsurgency theory makes one point clear: politics is primary. Unlike conventional military operations where seizing and holding ground is what matters, in COIN, what matters is the population, and to win them over is something that cannot be done by military force. Military force facilitates other parts of the effort, but it cannot win on its own. There are numerous things that are required to defeat an insurgency, and all the JDAMs and trigger-pullers in the world cannot do those things – the building of bonds between the government and the governed requires much more.

I risk oversimplifying things here, and I really should just post links to so many agencies and initiatives involved in the process of dealing with Afghanistan’s “root causes”, but they’re so many that I’d feel overwhelmed trying to do so. I think, however, if I highlight just a bit of the picture I’ve still done a service to the average reader because while the information is out there, it’s not being found by the average person.

Afghanistan, first of all, can be argued to be not a real nation-state. I think that’s a big of a brash statement, and I’m not saying I fully agree, but it is an interesting argument. It’s in part the product of lines drawn on a map during The Great Game (specifically, the Durand Line, the border created with British India/modern Pakistan, is a problem) which didn’t reflect tribal boundaries. Most of that border is unmarked, most of it is essentially ignored by the people who live in the area. It’s uncontrolled.  While there’s something of an emerging national identity as “Afghans”, people still identify by their ethnic group, and it’s worth noting that essentially Afghanistan is a country of minorities – the largest being the Pashtuns who are estimated to make up 42% of the population, followed by Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimaqs, Balochis, Nurestanis, Turkmen, and other smaller groups. There are two national languages, Pashto and Dari. Both the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam are represented here – Sunni being the most common, Shia being the religion of the Hazara. There’s never been a strong, unified national government really. Most rural areas are governed by traditional structures, which in the case of Pashtun regions are based on tribal structures primarily (the Tajiks, depending on who you ask, either long ago abandoned their tribal structure, or never had one to begin with). Those are largely influenced by ancient codes of conduct like Pashtunwali, which establishes a need to maintain honour, to offer sanctuary and hospitality to those who request it, and so on.

So, with this incredibly cursory explanation of the context in which Afghanistan exists, I hope you, the reader, get an idea of the dynamics which lead to the rise of the Taliban here, and why Al Qaeda found sanctuary here, and so on. Out of the chaos that followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent civil war, the Taliban showed up and provided swift justice and governance that lacked, and in some way security. Rooting them out will take providing those sorts of things, addressing economic concerns, and conveying a strong message that GIRoA (the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) can meet their needs and offer them a better life. Doesn’t that sound easy?

There’s been neat progress. A little town in Uruzgan Province, which is in the south, got sick of being a transit point for Taliban fighters heading to Kandahar and Helmand (two of the most restive provinces), so they basically raised their own militia and told them enough was enough. That was part of the impetus for the creation of the Afghan Local Police – forces selected by village elders to defend their own communities, trained with ISAF support, given uniforms and equipment, and built into the security strategy. They’re now active throughout the country, and address a void that ANSF forces haven’t gotten to yet. I say part of the impetus, because while this story is touted as being an ALP major success, I’m not sure it’s where it started. Related to that is a framework of improving governance in districts throughout the country – to make government relevant, to channel development projects better, and make sure that there’s reporting on how they’re doing.

There’s a program now running to reintegrate fighters who want to quit into society. It gives them a degree of amnesty (though there’s no codified amnesty, which allows the door to be open to prosecute people for things beyond the normal, expected things they’d do during insurgency), a little bit of financial support to transition, and helps reintegrate them into their communities, with rewards coming to the communities themselves. It’s a way out of the fighting with honour, and with a way to bring people back into their own village/tribal communities. It seems to work in many places, and recidivism is extremely low. The financial rewards aren’t significant, but instead it succeeds on the fact that many people are tired of fighting and there’s an enticement to help address those root causes in the communities.

The thing that has to be understood about the place is that those tribal structures where they exist in rural areas cannot be replaced by government. That won’t work. Similarly, the systems for justice that exist in those areas aren’t likely to be replaced by some system imposed from the national government – because for the most part, the processes in place meet community needs for resolving disputes. They’re able to address them quickly, in a manner relevant to the context of the area, in a way that’s accepted by the populace. Reconciling that with Afghanistan’s relatively modern, progressive constitution isn’t really easy, but there has to be some way to do so, because that represents the “Afghan good” we’re looking for – solutions that work even if they’re not what we see as ideal. As I understand it, the goal is that GIRoA will built its legitimacy amongst the people by harnessing those structures and those ways of doing things, and fusing them into their own structure for governance. So “we” – the various people contributing to stability, development, and defeating insurgency here – work to help the people of Afghanistan fit solutions to their problems in a context that works for them. We can help create that national identity of “Afghans” but it will need to be done in a context that respects all those other dynamics. But the work of really making it work and last must be done by Afghans – and more importantly – IS being done by Afghans.

When you take it to the simple level that I think you can argue that Afghans are like humans anywhere in their basic wants – to live in peace, without fear, with some measure of security (economic security included), and with a reasonable expectation that their children will grow up to live better lives than them, it seems that we can expect progress.

I will try – I really will – to come up with some expansion on these efforts. There’s lots of information out there, though it’s not all totally clear and easy to find, but I think with a little effort I’ll find time for I can try to create some order to it for those interested. There are so many agencies involved – so many moving parts – that they all have little tidbits to contribute to the story. I’m sure there are many sources out there which can present so much of this in a more academic way, and in truth, I could too – but it’s a bit more than I’m capable of at the moment, and I hope this overview is more effective at catching attention of a broader audience who will go and dig deeper if they see value in it.

No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy…

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Today we got a crash course in Counterinsurgency (COIN). COIN is the nature of the kind of operation that is ongoing in Afghanistan, and based on history, it’s something that the Canadian Army will have to get better at over the next few years to be prepared for future operations. The reality is that since the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, three quarters of military conflicts have been insurgencies or other low intensity conflicts. The massive global conflagrations that are what first spring to mind when one thinks of war are indeed very rare.

COIN is something that no one has really done well, in no small part, I think, because it’s hard for a conventional military to wrap its collective minds around how to deal with insurgencies. The British were probably the first to start understanding COIN during the Malaya Emergency, and it’s from that in part that we got the idea of “Hearts & Minds”.

Problem #1 is that a lot of people don’t understand, even at a fundamental level what it means.

“When you’ve got them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow…”

Well, there’s no easy way to get the balls of an insurgency that blends seamlessly into the population. There’s no battle front, there’s no Fulda Gap to stare across at your “most probable military opponent” (which is one term that the Soviet Army apparently used for Americans when teaching officers about tactics), there’s no way to actually accomplish this. And of course, it’s totally not the idea, but I’ll get back to that.

“Remember, hearts and minds, boys. Two in the chest, one in the head, that’s hearts and minds.”

Yep. I heard that on a close quarter combat range once. I can’t gloss over what we do, remember. We are trained in the art of using deadly force. We are trained to kill people. I’m in the infantry. That is our job. The Role Of The Infantry, which is taught to us and we’re constant reminded of throughout training, is bluntly this: “To close with and destroy the enemy, by day or by night, regardless of season, terrain or weather.” There’s no glossing over it. But remember that thing from ethics? I have no problem telling my mom what I do in the army. In addition to that blunt description, of course, we have the ability to harness our organizational and leadership skills to do all sorts of things. But our training necessarily revolves around that role.

So what’s the phrase actually mean? Well, the important thing in a counterinsurgency campaign is to understand how insurgencies work, what the prerequisites are, and how to counter them. Insurgencies happen because the insurgent organization is able to exploit a vacuum. When governments fail to address the needs or wants of a society, an insurgency can emerge. The Taliban, for example, rose to power by helping resolve what amounted to legal disputes, and providing law and order, which didn’t exist in most of the country. Rising in the Pashtun southern part of the country, they harnessed both religion and tribal customs and were able to become strong enough to take over the whole country. When they were routed in 2001, they resumed a highly effective insurgency.

It’s worth noting that they not only exploit the vacuum, they  essentially help create it by destabilizing the areas they still can influence. There’s a lot more complex forms of insurgency that can develop too, but I’ll be writing a university paper if I try to get into them all, and well, if I’m going to do that, I’ll write a book and sell it. Or something.

Thus, the idea of winning hearts and minds doesn’t mean winning a popularity contest. It means convincing the local national population that the Host Nation government can meet their needs. It doesn’t even need to meet them now – it just needs to gain the trust of the populace that it will be able to in the future. It means understanding the root causes beyond the surface grievances, getting to understand them, and empowering the Host Nation to address them. Winning hearts and minds means that we set conditions for both an emotional and logical conclusion that the Host Nation can address those problems. It’s not a simple matter of dumping some foreign aid on them, or fighting off insurgents when they attack. It’s about cutting the insurgency off from their base of support, making it such that the local population no longer needs or supports them, and no longer wants anything to do with them. That isolation ends their relevance.

What you’re probably coming to understand is that the military cannot do it all, but we’re definitely a significant part of the problem.

Modern COIN doctrine gives us four stages: Shape, Clear, Hold, Build. We’re basically embarking on the “Build” stage, to create the capabilities within the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the Afghan National Security Forces to operate effectively, to provide a state that meets the needs and wants of its people. That will cut the Taliban off from its support (mostly, there’s foreign interference of course, and that’s a whole other problem), and render them increasingly irrelevant. With that, hopefully, a generation of Afghan kids will grow up not knowing war, get educated, and be able to provide for themselves and their family without turning to fighting. That’s the goal at the highest level. If that doesn’t sell you on why I’m going, well, probably nothing will. I absolutely can proudly tell my mom that that’s what I’m doing for the next year or so.

The guidance we have seems almost comically simple. Drink lots of chai (Afghan tea, which is served over conversation). Treat every soldier as a sensor gathering information on the environment and the variety of factors that contribute to the nature and persistence of insurgency. And the one I love: get out of your vehicles, take off your sunglasses – sit and look counterparts in the eye and have a good discussion, find out what will work to move forward. Oakleys are a barrier to building the trust that Afghans want with us, according to the Big Boss. Makes sense to me, actually. It really does. We need to build lasting relationships so that the people we advise see a value in working with us.

COIN requires a willingness to keep up the “clear” task. A well-executed COIN campaign, which is what ISAF is working to set up, will be able to reintegrate most of the insurgents into society, to get them to see the value of working with rather than against the Host Nation government, in this case GIRoA. Some, however, will be incorrigible. They will never be able to let go, and so, we – or more specifically, the ANSF must be prepared to go out and kill them. It’s that simple. The goal is to get them to think like we do – that we can either be a solid partner, comrade, friend – or will spare no effort to root you out. We’ve got a lot to learn still, and I think COIN will be an ongoing Professional Development study topic while we’re away. But we’re getting the idea, and learning how to present ourselves to the challenge.

I am a Canadian soldier. In me you will know no better friend, and no worse enemy. That was one of the quips in the presentation we had today, and it sort of resonated.